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My assignment for this essay is to write about education
from an evangelical Protestant perspective. Others in the
symposium will address this topic from other religious or secular
perspectives. Under these circumstances, my task becomes both
personal and representative. As a self-identified evangelical
Christian, I am supposed to write from my own perspective,
while at the same time, representing more broadly the
perspective of other evangelicals. Although this role is familiar
to me, its difficulties should be clarified at the outset.
One difficulty is definition, particularly of the term
"evangelical Protestant." For purposes of this essay, I would
define evangelical Protestantism as involving the following:
(1) Adherence to classic Christian orthodoxy, and hence
to monotheistic Trinitarian theology, as reflected in
ancient creedal statements such as the Apostle's and
Nicene Creed.
(2) Acceptance of the Protestant Old Testament and New
Testament canon as inspired scripture and the
preeminent source of religious authority, with such
scripture regarded as reliable and true (i.e.
infallible/inerrant).
(3) An emphasis on a personal relationship between each
individual believer and God, expressed as a relationship of
trust and faith in Christ, which involves the individual
turning away from sin and toward God (personal
repentance).
t Professor of Law, Cumberland Law School, Samford University.
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(4) An emphasis on "evangelism," based on a Biblical
mandate to spread the Christian faith to persons of every
national, ethnic, and cultural group. Thus, evangelicals
believe that the Christian faith represents universal truth
and the way of salvation applicable in every culture.'
Given the above characteristics, it should not be surprising
that most evangelicals accept traditional Christian teachings
regarding questions of personal and sexual morality.2
Evangelicals in the United States have often been far more
divided, however, regarding political matters, given the lack of a
consensus on issues relating to economic and foreign policy, and
the proper role of government.
Given this definition of an "evangelical Protestant," a broad
range of theologically-conservative Protestants would fit the
definition, including the following--often overlapping-sub-
groups:
(1) The large group of theologically-conservative Baptists,
including Southern Baptists and Independent Baptists.
(2) "Fundamentalists," defined narrowly to include those
evangelicals who tend to interpret the scriptures, and
particularly the first three chapters of Genesis, more
literally than some evangelicals, and who usually reflect a
"dispensational" theology.
(3) Pentecostals and Charismatics, who emphasize and
practice the continued validity of "speaking in tongues"
and other supernatural "gifts of the Spirit."
The word "evangelical" is often used to refer to all theologically-conservative
Protestants. Given the format of this symposium, with only a single Protestant
Christian contributor, this broader sense seems most appropriate. Others use the
term more narrowly, for example by separating fundamentalists and evangelicals
into separate groups, or imposing narrower definitional requirements. I have
attempted to formulate a definition that is simultaneously broad enough to
encompass the diverse kinds of theologically-conservative Protestants, while also
highlighting some of the distinctive emphases of most theologically-conservative
Protestants and of the self-identified "evangelical" movement. The definition is
necessarily imperfect due to the large size and diversity of the group in question. For
background on definitions of the term "evangelical," see CHRISTIAN SMITH,
CHRISTIAN AMERICA? 13-19 (2000), J. CHRISTOPHER SOPER, EVANGELICAL
CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 37-45 (1994), and see
generally THE VARIETY OF AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM (Donald W. Dayton & Robert
K. Johnston eds., 1991). For useful historical and interpretative work on
evangelicalism, see generally GEORGE M. MARSDEN, UNDERSTANDING
FUNDAMENTALISM AND EVANGELICALISM 1-6 (1991).
2 See, e.g., SAM REIMER, EVANGELICALS AND THE CONTINENTAL DIVIDE 72-102
(2003).
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(4) Evangelicals remaining within the larger mainline
Protestant denominations, including Methodists,
Lutherans, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians.
(5) Evangelicals belonging to denominations which have
broken away from their mainline counterparts as a
protest against theological and/or moral liberalism (i.e.
the Presbyterian Church in America), or which otherwise
constitute a theologically-conservative portion of a historic
Protestant group (i.e. the Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod).
(6) Evangelicals belonging to various
"nondenominational" churches not identified with a
traditional (i.e. Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian) group.
(7) Evangelicals identifying with various denominations
or local churches particularly associated with an ethnic
minority, such as African-American churches, Korean
churches, etc.
(8) Evangelicals who are relatively uninvolved with a
traditional church congregation, although they may still
participate in para-church organizations or regularly
watch Christian media programs.3
Although this list is not complete, it is extensive enough to
indicate the difficulty of accurately representing a single
"evangelical" Christian point of view. Although there is a
common core of belief and attitude on many matters, evangelicals
within the United States cross so many cultural, racial, ethnic,
language, class, and other lines as to understandably splinter on
many issues. The sheer size of the group is also daunting.
According to some estimates, Evangelicals represent somewhere
between one quarter and one third of the population of the
United States, and thus may number between seventy and
3 See sources cited supra note 1; REIMER, supra note 2, at 3-21. It should be
noted that some individuals I have grouped within the broader evangelical world
identify much more strongly with their particularly theological or denominational
tradition, such as Lutheran, and weakly or not at all with the broader term
"evangelical." Yet, from a broader perspective these individuals are nonetheless
"evangelicals." In addition, one significant group not mentioned in the text is the
Anabaptists (i.e. Mennonites). Some sources and some Mennonites clearly place
some parts of the Anabaptist movement within evangelicalism. Some, however, see
Anabaptism as separate even from Protestantism, and in essence, as its own
category. On the relationship between fundamentalism and evangelicalism, and
differing uses of those terms, see, for example, SUSAN FRIEND HARDING, THE BOOK
OF JERRY FALWELL: FUNDAMENTALIST LANGUAGE AND POLITICS, at xv-xvi (2000),
and MARSDEN, supra note 1, at 1-6.
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ninety-five million persons.' To describe an evangelical
perspective on a subject is therefore to attempt to describe the
perspectives of a large plurality of Americans.
A second difficulty intrinsic to this essay is inherent in the
task of representation. I cannot presume that my views on a
given subject are necessarily reflective of most evangelicals.
Despite this problem, my own life experience has given me the
opportunity to understand a large range of the evangelical world
within the United States. I first became involved in evangelical
Christianity in college, where I was involved in a campus group
loosely affiliated with InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, a
prominent evangelical para-church organization. In my early
Christian life, I attended and was baptized in a large charismatic
church. Subsequently, I was confirmed in the mainline Episcopal
Church, participating in several different congregations. For the
last fifteen years, I have been involved, as a member and ruling
elder, with a local congregation of the Presbyterian Church in
America ("PCA"), which is the largest of the theological-
conservative denominations to have broken off from the mainline
Presbyterian Church.' In addition, I have taught for many years
at Samford University, which has been associated in various
ways with the Southern Baptist Convention, and which also
contains an inter-denominational evangelical Divinity School
where I have both taught and taken classes. Finally, for much of
my adult life I have lived in the South, where evangelical
Christians are a prominent part of the culture. Thus, when I
write from an "evangelical Christian" perspective, I try to think
4 See, e.g., REIMER, supra note 2, at 5 (counting "only... those evangelicals who
attend conservative Protestant denominations, evangelicals account for roughly one-
quarter of the American population"); SMITH, supra note 1, at 16-17 (conservative
Protestants constitute "about 29 percent of the American population"). Burkhard
Bilger, a staff writer for The New Yorker, stated that "[t]he United States has an
estimated eighty million evangelical Christians." See Burkhard Bilger, God Doesn't
Need Ole Anthony, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 2004, at 70. The viewpoint that one-
third of Americans are "evangelicals" has sometimes been linked to a Gallup poll in
the 1970's finding that approximately one-third of Americans (34%) professed to be
"born-again," defined as "a turning point in your life when you committed yourself to
Jesus Christ." HARDING, supra note 3, at 19, 126 (citing GEORGE GALLUP, JR.,
RELIGION IN AMERICA (1982)).
5 In order to be fully accurate, I should add that my local congregation is in the
process of transitioning from the PCA to another Reformed/Presbyterian
denomination.
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beyond my own views to those of the many different strands of
the evangelical church.
A third difficulty with this representative task concerns that
of audience. As an academic who was raised in a secularized
Jewish family from New York City, I am keenly aware of how
alien and threatening evangelical Christians appear to many in
the United States. Many Americans, particularly outside of the
South, apparently live their day-to-day lives without much
meaningful interchange with evangelical Christians. Certainly,
many academics operate in a milieu in which evangelicals are
marginalized, and only present, if at all, at the periphery.6
Moreover, there seems to be very little interest in
understanding-rather than demonizing-the evangelical world.
Thus, among many Americans there is a striking combination of
hostility and ignorance regarding the historical and
contemporary role of evangelical Christianity in the United
States. To take just one example, when The New Yorker
interviewed billionaire philanthropist George Soros concerning
his involvement in the 2004 Presidential campaign, Soros
"contended that Bush's religious beliefs are in conflict with
America's democratic traditions. 'The separation of church and
state, the bedrock of our democracy, is clearly undermined by
having a born-again President. ' 7
Thus, Soros apparently believes that the tens of millions of
Americans who can be characterized as "born-again" Christians
are constitutionally excluded from serving as President. This
6 Bill Stuntz summarized attitudes toward Christianity in the legal academy as
follows:
Why should anyone think about law in Christian terms? Perhaps the
answer is, no one should. That is surely the conclusion most American law
professors would reach. Religion is not a topic of much conversation in the
law school world; what little discussion there is tends to treat serious
religious commitment as a disease-call it the germ theory of religion-
perhaps especially if the religion is Christianity.
William J. Stuntz, Christian Legal Theory, 116 HARv. L. REV. 1707, 1707 (2003)
(reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL THOUGHT (Michael W. McConell et
al. eds., 2001)). Similarly, in a recent New York Times article, Peter H. Schuck, a
Yale law professor, supported the "question[ing] [of] whether religious perspectives
are welcomed at mainstream law schools" and explained that "[t]here is a sort of soft
tolerance of competing views.., but no real interest in exposing students to
seriously developed contrary points of view that proceed from a strong faith-based
perspective. Fundamentalism is derided." See Adam Liptak, Giving the Law a
Religious Perspective, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2004, at A16.
7 Jane Mayer, The Money Man, THE NEW YORKER, Oct. 18, 2004, at 176, 184.
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kind of large-scale exclusion of a group from a public office is of
course one of the most profoundly anti-democratic positions one
could take, yet Soros sees it as necessary to "America's
democratic traditions."'  Similarly, Soros' citation of the
Constitution to support the exclusion of certain religious groups
from public office is astonishing, given the Constitution's
protection of religious liberty and the specific prohibition of
religious tests for public office. 9
In trying to explain Bush's appeal, Soros explained that "[iun
uncertain times, people want to escape to safety. They seek a
father figure, who acts with conviction .... Bush does have
conviction. He practically claims a link to God.'"
Whatever one thinks of this typically demeaning analysis of
George W. Bush's political appeal, the most striking thing about
it from an evangelical perspective is its misunderstanding of
evangelical religious experience. Soros apparently finds it so
astonishing that anyone would claim a "link to God" that he has
to place the adjective "practically" in front of it, while viewing it
as a reason why Bush would be viewed as exceptional. Within
the evangelical world, however, everyone claims a link to God.
This direct link of the individual to God-with Jesus as sole
mediator-is a key mark of evangelical religion. Throughout the
evangelical world, ordinary people-rich, poor, and middle-class;
African-American, Asian, Hispanic, and White; women and men;
children and adults-of all vocations and regions of the country,
talk endlessly with Jesus, and talk endlessly with others about
their relationship to Jesus. While for Soros the claim that "God
speaks to me" would be an impossible hubris threatening the
foundations of the Republic, in evangelical America your
hairdresser is likely talking to Jesus or about Jesus while she
cuts your hair, and your lawyer may be praying for guidance on
her lunch-break.
George Soros is obviously a highly intelligent individual who
prides himself on promoting the "free expression of critical
8 Id.
9 See U.S. CONST. art. VI ("[B]ut no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States."); U.S. CONST.
amend. I (religion clauses). Obviously, the exclusion of a person from federal office
based on their religion would violate the "religious Test" clause, as well as the
religion clauses.
'0 Mayer, supra note 7, at 184.
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thought,"" and yet in the area of evangelical religion, he
apparently speaks and acts without doing any historical,
sociological, or legal exploration of his subject matter. Similarly,
while Soros claims that he has "always been against dividing the
world into 'us' versus 'them,"'' 2 in the area of evangelical religion,
he instinctively labels the "born-again" as a "them" who must be
excluded from power. 3
Unfortunately, this kind of blind spot in relation to
evangelical Christianity is very common among many in the
United States and exemplifies the response of many, and perhaps
most, academics.
This blind spot toward evangelical Christianity among
academics contributes to the creation of political or legal theories
that, in one manner or another, question the legitimacy of
evangelical political or societal involvement. Some years ago, I
tried to respond to the work of Michael Perry, Kent Greenawalt,
and others, who had constructed elaborate theoretical constructs
that suggested that evangelical Christians could not, based on
their religious convictions, participate fully in American political
life.' 4  Over time, it became clear to me that, aside from the
benefit of talking with some very nice people, there was little
purpose served in these dialogues. A world in which evangelical
Christians are barred from serving in public office, or from voting
based on their religious convictions, is fortunately not the world
of either the United States Constitution or the contemporary
" Id. at 178.
12 Id. at 184.
"3 See id.
14 See David M. Smolin, Regulating Religious and Cultural Conflict in a
Postmodern America: A Response to Professor Perry, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1991); see
also KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 164-79
(1995); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY
IN AMERICAN POLITICS 100-05, 139-41 (1991). Some of the individuals in question
may have changed their minds in the years since about limiting political
involvement based on religious conviction. For example, Michael Perry's current
webpage biography states, "[Perry's] forthcoming book, 'Under God? Religious Faith
and Liberal Democracy,' argues that political reliance on religious faith violates
neither the Constitution's establishment clause nor the morality of liberal
democracy. The book also addresses three issues at the center of American public
life: school vouchers, same-sex marriage and abortion." See Emory Law School
Faculty Profiles-Michael Perry, at http://www.law.emory.edu/faculty/facbio2.php?
userid=mperry (last visited Mar. 24, 2005). Of course, the theoretical constructs in
question were often inspired or based on the work of John Rawls. See, e.g.,
GREENAWALT, supra, at 106-13.
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political system. Despite the wishes of George Soros, or the
elaborated theories of professors, such a world is not likely to
exist anytime in the near future. The real limitations on
religious persons acting politically must come from within their
own religious traditions, or from the practical necessities of
operating within a religiously pluralistic society with certain
traditions on such matters. The apparently endless capacity of
some Americans to construct theories questioning the legitimacy
of evangelical Christian participation in the broader society can
only be met by endlessly pointing out the obviously anti-
democratic and unconstitutional features of such limitations, a
task with which I finally became weary.
Yet, in accepting this assignment, in which I speak as and on
behalf of evangelicals within an academic forum, I am once again
implicitly encountering this problem. While I can hope that the
Catholic nature of this forum will promise some friendlier
readers, to the degree this symposium is read more broadly by
American academics, the reception is likely to be chilly. Further,
since this essay will be responding to the work of Professor Jim
Dwyer, whose negative attitude toward evangelicals appears to
rival that of Soros, 5 the same old battle to establish the political
rights of evangelicals to a hostile audience is once again upon me.
Having seen all of this many times before, my inclination
this time is to go beyond my usual calls for democratic inclusion
of evangelicals, and address from a Christian perspective the fact
and causes of hostility toward evangelicals. Unfortunately, to do
so is to risk appearing insulting to secularists. Few like to see
themselves in the mirror of other's perceptions. Certainly, it is
not enjoyable for evangelicals to be told-by Soros and others-
that they hold religious or political views as a flight from
uncertainty and freedom, as though evangelical religion was
fundamentally based on cowardice and other character flaws. 16
Nonetheless, there is a certain ideological consistency in this
analysis: if you presume that evangelical religion is false, then
the strength of evangelical conviction must be explained by some
psychological process accounting for large numbers of people
5 See infra notes 47-49 and accompanying text.
16 This is the sort of argument I take Soros to be making when he cites Erich
Fromm's study of totalitarianism, Escape From Freedom, to explain the appeal of
Bush and his religious conviction to American voters. See Mayer, supra note 7, at
184.
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adhering to a fantasy. What secularists may not have
understood is that the Christian faith similarly has long
accounted for the rejection of Christianity.
This essay therefore has the ambitious agenda of presenting
evangelical perspectives on both education and state regulation
of religious education in a way that takes account of both
evangelical theological perspectives and anti-evangelical
hostility. Doubtless the essay will have multiple failings, but
hopefully it will prove of interest and use to some.
II. THE CHRISTIAN TRUTH-CLAIM IN A CULTURALLY-DIVERSE
WORLD17
Christianity is designed-Christians would say by God-to
cross-cultural boundaries. Consider the New Testament, which
records, among other things, the words of Jesus; yet the Gospels,
with the exception of a few words, record Jesus' words in
translation-koine Greek-rather than the original Aramaic.
Apparently, it was more important to place the words in a
language accessible across many cultures, than to record the
words in the original form spoken by Jesus.
Christianity is designed-Christians would say by God-to
be universal in its claims. The religion claims to express the
truth and way applicable at every time and place, and in every
culture. Therefore, Christianity is designed to have multiple
points of contact with every non-Christian perspective and
philosophy. From a Christian perspective, the truths found in
non-Christian religions and philosophies are ultimately either
compatible with, or already found within, Christianity. The
errors found in non-Christian perspectives are distortions of the
truths found in Christianity.
These abstract Christian apologetic views take on an edge in
the contemporary world, particularly as many non-Christian
perspectives have developed in direct response to, and in
rejection of, Christianity. In those instances, the points of
contact with Christianity are clear enough, but primarily
negative. Thus, some Western intellectual traditions seem to
mimic Biblical "liberation from oppression" narratives, but make
17 This section of the essay will be presented essentially without footnotes. Of
course I am not claiming that these views are uniquely mine; in the context of this
essay, I am trying to address the issues in continuity with an evangelical
perspective.
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Christianity into the oppressor! So, particularly in the Western
tradition, we have quasi-Biblical narratives in which Christianity
is portrayed as tyrannical, oppressive, idolatrous, superstitious,
cruel, and shrouded in darkness, while the non-Christian
perspective is portrayed as just, liberating, worshipful of the
Good, rational, kind, and filled with light.
Christianity, of course, acknowledges that people have often
acted wrongly and oppressively in the name of God, Christ, and
Christianity. The easy way of dealing with this problem would
be to say that what humans do in the name of God is irrelevant.
However, Christianity is a relational religion concerned with
creating bonds and covenants among human beings. Thus, the
religion continues to affirm the relative goodness and importance
of the church, while struggling to heal the wounds that have
flowed and continue to flow from the wrongs done by Christians
and in the name of Christ. The alternative of promoting
Christianity as an abstract truth with no present relevance to
human relationships in this world is incompatible with the self-
understanding of Christianity. From a Christian perspective, the
religion applies to every area of life and every human
relationship. The struggle of "sinful" human beings to follow the
perfect teachings of God in their daily lives is central to the
shared experience of Christians, and Christianity therefore finds
meaning, rather than irrelevance, even in the failures of those
who practice the religion.
Christians generally believe that the struggles of both
Christians and non-Christians with the sinfulness of Christians,
and of Christian institutions and organizations, should be placed
in the context of our relationship with God. Christianity teaches
that every human being has an inherent and fundamental
relationship with God. Although analogies are always imperfect,
"rejecting" God is like rejecting the air we breathe; atheism is as
rational as fish deciding to "not believe" in the water in which
they swim. Our very being is a derivative copy of the "I AM" who
brought us into being, and who sustains our existence from
moment to moment. Further, Christianity teaches that "fallen"
human beings begin their existence alienated from God, with a
fundamentally broken relationship with their Creator. Thus, we
are generally born with a kind of "chip on our shoulder," looking
for reasons to resent and rebel against God. Unless that
relationship is healed, we will find reasons to hate, ignore, or
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disbelieve in God, whether they are the callous acts of Christians,
the horrific injustices that fill the world, some personal tragedy,
or simply a personal preference to be free of the yoke of God.
The dynamic of our relationship to God permeates both a
Christian understanding of education, and also a Christian
understanding of the critics of Christian education. This essay
will concern both. In order to begin with the positive, however,
this essay will next present some perspectives on education.
III. EVANGELICAL PROTESTANT PERSPECTIVES ON THE
EDUCATION OF CHILDREN
Christianity holds in tension a covenantal perspective in
which children of Christians are deemed as being in a special
(covenantal) relationship with God, and an individualist
perspective in which each human being is responsible for their
own relationship with God, without any benefit of family, racial,
ethnic, or class favoritism.18 There are many different ways of
balancing these inherent tensions. For example, some baptize
infants as a sign of their special place within the covenant, while
others refuse to baptize infants because they cannot make an
individual profession of faith ascertainable to the Christian
community.
The nurture of children within the Christian community is
fundamental within a religion where family relationships are
used as analogies for the individual and community relationship
with God. Although the Christian religion is a missionary and
evangelistic religion, today approximately 90% of the
demographic growth of the church worldwide comes from the
birth of children to Christian families.1 9 Whether these children
1S As will become apparent, I use the term "covenant" here in a non-technical
sense to generally describe the relationships and obligations of a child born into a
Christian family, rather than in the related, more theologically-technical sense used
within Calvinist or reformed theological systems.
'9 See Michael Jaffarian, The Statistical State of the Missionary Enterprise,
MISSIOLOGY, Jan. 2002, at 15, 19. The statistic may be somewhat misleading. The
author arrives at the gain due to conversion by subtracting the number leaving
Christianity through conversion from the number becoming Christian through
conversion. By contrast, the increase in Christians through birth stands alone. Thus,
according to the author, in a typical year in the 1990's, the number of Christians
increased by 25.2 million overall, with 19 million converting to Christianity, 16.5
million "defections" from Christianity (for a net gain of 2.5 million), and 22.7 million
coming by natural increase. Id. at 19. Thus, one could state, based on these
statistics, that only 54% of the new Christians in the world each year were due to
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are counted as Christians, or seen as the most immediate mission
field for evangelization, the fact remains that their religious
nurturance is both a religious and a practical duty. Indeed, it is
a truism that the Christian religion is always only a generation
away from extinction.
This duty to nurture Christian faith in each new generation
has complex implications for K-12 education. A part of that
,complexity comes from discerning the appropriate roles for home,
school, and church. There is no single model in either the
international Christian community, nor more narrowly among
evangelical Protestants in the United States, concerning the
right allocation of practical tasks within these three institutions.
Some combine all three into the home, by home-schooling and
"home-churching," while others find it important to divide the
work among separate institutions.
Attitudes toward the proper role of government in education
also vary widely, even within various theological communities.
Many are quite comfortable sending their children to public
schools, while others deride "government schools" as inherently
godless institutions. Some would seek to infuse some degree of
religion into public schools, while others would not want public
schools teaching religion. These varying attitudes toward
religion and education are related, in complex ways, to different
religious attitudes toward government itself, a topic too complex
to adequately address in this essay.
A common thread that would elicit broad agreement amongst
diverse Christian viewpoints is the importance of treating
children in a developmentally appropriate manner. The child is
generally not perceived as an autonomous agent, or a miniature
adult. The child is perceived as the proper subject of various
legitimate human authorities, including parents, pastors, and
teachers. The establishment of these authorities over the life of
the child is not understood as an evil, but rather as a benefit to
the child. It is the nature of the Christian religion to structure
human relationships within a network of legitimate, yet limited,
authorities; this truism is seen as applying to both children and
adults. Thus, even religious traditions that emphasize that the
child must ultimately make their own decision whether or not to
natural increase (births). Of course, in either case, the increase to world Christianity
from births is quite significant to the generational continuity of the church.
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join the religious community would perceive it as perfectly proper
and appropriate that the child be subject to religiously-grounded
authorities. The child may have the right to rebel inwardly
against God-however awful the consequences of that may be.
The child has no "right," however, to actively rebel against the
human authorities placed over him or her. And this principle,
moreover, does not depend on those authorities themselves being
Christian. A young child who converts to Christianity would
generally be charged to obey and respect even non-Christian
parents. A Christian child generally would be taught to respect
and obey his or her public school teachers, regardless of the
teacher's religion.
The requirement of obedience to authorities does have
important limitations. Just as there are traditions within
Christianity justifying disobedience-or even revolution-against
political authorities,2 ° there are some circumstances where
children would be charged to disobey their parents or teachers. A
child told to forsake or curse Christ, or directly instructed to
engage in some immoral or unethical act, would be under an
obligation to obey God rather than his or her parents or teachers.
Contemporary Christians are generally as aghast at child abuse
as anyone else in our society, and thus in instances of clear abuse
would be willing to set aside the authority of the parent in favor
of protecting the child. They would generally not, however,
consider a spanking to the bottom to be abuse.
The vast majority of evangelicals within the United States
therefore combine a voluntary tradition regarding religion with a
belief that children, and adults, necessarily live within an
ordered world of divinely-constituted human authorities. While
the two are combined in somewhat different ways, and may
appear confusing to outsiders, generally both truths are clearly
embraced. The voluntary tradition correlates to the individualist
strand that requires every person to encounter God, without any
familial or other favoritism. This voluntary principle would
emphasize that no one can be forced or made into being a
20 Relevant scriptural texts include Exodus 1:15-2:10; Hebrews 11:23; Joshua
2:1-15; Esther 4:1-5:2; Daniel 3, 6; Acts 4:1-22, 5:17-29. Relevant texts from the
Western theological tradition include SAINT AUGUSTINE, ON FREE CHOICE OF THE
WILL, bk. I, ch. V, at 11 (Anna S. Benjamin & L.H. Hackstaff trans., 1964); CALVIN,
INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION, bk. IV, ch. XX, §§ 31-32, at 1518-21 (John
T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., 1960).
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Christian against his or her will, and that it would be wrong to
try. By "Christian," one means, in this voluntary context, one
who truly and eternally belongs to God, rather than merely one
who would be externally counted as a Christian for purposes of
church rolls. Within this personal encounter with God, all of the
inborn obstacles to Christian faith must be overcome: our innate
hatred of and resentment against God, our inner doubts
regarding His existence and goodness, our personal struggles to
overcome the evil (sin) within us, and the difficulty of trusting
God amidst tragic circumstances in our own lives or those of
others. This is a realm in which we may be taught, comforted,
nurtured, and encouraged, but ultimately each individual must
voluntarily "choose God" for themselves. Of course there are
varying theological beliefs pertaining to the role God plays in our
choice of Him, some of which give God the decisive and initiating
role, but that also is a matter of our personal relationship with
God.
Generally speaking, these voluntary and individualist
emphases are not understood to negate the necessary role of
divinely-authorized human relationships and authorities, nor of
the existence of enforceable and fixed ethical and moral norms.
Christianity does not teach that we only live in God's world if we
choose God; to the contrary, however we may deny, ignore, or
reject God, we live in relationship to God and within the world
and moral order He has created. From a Christian point of view,
escaping God and His ethical and moral order completely is
simply impossible for us as creatures created in the image of God.
Moreover, the human and natural world we inhabit requires the
enforcement of some degree of ethical norms for the sake of the
common good. In short, radical autonomy in which a human
being creates and re-creates him/herself, as though a blank slate
(tabula rosa), through his or her own non-contingent choices, is a
mere fantasy. Attempts to create a society based on this sort of
radical autonomy would be a suicide pact that would no more
remove us from the rule of God than jumping off a cliff would
constitute an effective rebellion against gravity.
Further, the varied Christian perspectives on governmental
authority common within America all perceive God, in some
manner or other, as the predicate of civil and political liberty.
God is generally viewed as the original provider of legitimate
rights, as in the Declaration of Independence, and as providing a
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basis of accountability and limitation for all human and
governmental authority. From these perspectives, individual
liberty occurs because of, not despite, God. Individual liberty
may sometimes include the political "right" to embrace the
fantasy of radical individual autonomy, but it in no way requires
the entire society to define liberty as equivalent to such a
fantasy.
Thus, the widely varied evangelical Christian approaches to
education would generally expect children to be raised within a
set of legitimate societal and familial expectations. Whether
children were enrolled in public, private, religious, or home-
school, they would generally be raised within the world as it is,
which is to say within God's world. This term, "God's world,"
expresses a rejection of radical human autonomy and an
acknowledgement that we all live within the zone of creation:
the world that God has made. As a matter of character, living in
the world that God has made means that all children may be
subject to legitimate expectations regarding their behavior. The
daunting task of self-mastery requires that children be raised
within structures of clear expectations, over time internalizing
not only particular norms but also the capacity to guide their
behavior according to norms.
As a matter of substantive content, living in God's world
means acceptance of education as a means to transmit
information necessary to life within contemporary society and
culture. From this perspective, the attainment of a certain body
of knowledge is an important developmental task of childhood.
Thus, the overwhelming majority of evangelical Christians would
want their children to possess the knowledge represented by a
solid academic education in traditional subjects, such as history,
geography, mathematics, science, and English.
As a matter of intellectual capacity, living in God's world
also means acquiring a high level of intellectual skill. Thus, an
overwhelming majority of American evangelicals would, like
American parents generally, wish their children to acquire
excellent intellectual and academic skills. Thus, contemporary
theorists of Christian education emphasize the attainment of
critical thinking, self-expression, and other higher-order
intellectual skills, particularly in the high school years. There
are several justifications common within the Christian world for
pursuit of intellectual skill. First, there is recognition that life
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within a complex society is aided by such skills. Second, there is
a view that critical thinking skills make it easier to see through
the deceptive lies and temptations of an often anti-Christian
popular and higher culture. Third, there is a general
appreciation for the honing of intellectual skills as simply
another aspect of human development. Fourth, there is the
understanding of higher academic attainment as a path to
vocational success. All of these view higher intellectual
attainment as completely compatible with living within the world
as God has made it.
One of the fundamental divergences between theologically-
conservative Christianity and some secular intellectual ideologies
centers on this question of higher-order intellectual skills. Some
secular intellectuals seem to believe that higher-order thinking is
incompatible with orthodox Christianity, or indeed any other
"orthodoxy." Thus, some seem to think that orthodox
Christianity requires the individual to blind themselves to
evidence or reason, makes the Christian unable to view the world
from multiple perspectives, or is an escape from the complexities
of life. Some Christian apologists would take the opposite
perspective, and argue that higher-order thinking is dependent
on certain fixed presuppositions, or even, on a theoretical level,
on theistic presuppositions. This Christian apologetic argument
can be summarized as follows:2
It has been known since the ancient world that
"philosophical disputes involving competing basic moral premises
and rules of moral evidence inevitably beg the question, argue in
a circle, or engage an infinite regress. '22 Thus, the only way to
reason forward toward a conclusion is to begin with
presuppositions-including methodologies-that cannot
themselves be conclusively demonstrated to dissenters as correct.
21 As in prior sections of the Article, the following section on apologetics is
designed to be consistent with an evangelical perspective. My approach is generally
consistent with the tradition of presuppositional apologetics, although that tradition
itself has several different divisions, and I make no attempt to follow any one at all
points. Presuppositional apologetics may constitute a minority approach to
apologetics, particularly given the mistaken impression that this approach refuses to
use "evidences." In any event, some useful sources include JOHN M. FRAME, THE
DOCTRINE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD (1987), and CORNELIUS VAN TIL, THE
DEFENSE OF THE FAITH (3d ed. 1967).
22 H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., Giving, Selling, and Having Taken: Conflicting
Views of Organ Transfer, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 29, 39 (2004).
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From this perspective, the choice of Christian theological
presuppositions is no more "anti-intellectual" or intellectually
arbitrary than beginning with, for example, those of John Rawls.
More controversially, it has been argued that the attribution
of rational meaning to evidence, facts, or arguments is dependent
on theistic presuppositions.23 Thus, if one assumes a purely
naturalist, materialist world governed entirely by the chance
outcomes of the laws of nature, there is no reason to believe that
human minds would possess the capacity to know or reason
accurately. Indeed, within a mechanistic, dead universe, the
existence of both life and consciousness appear anomalous. If the
fundamental nature of the universe is dead matter governed by
mindless laws of nature, then life and consciousness would
appear to be incidental and inherently "meaningless" freaks of
nature. Within such a world, the human habit of attributing
meaning would be a mere fantasy, as it would correlate neither
to any higher or inherent form of consciousness within or beyond
the universe, nor to the nature of the universe itself. Attributing
meaning within such a universe would be like the human habit of
attributing human characteristics to animals or things: a kind of
anthromorphism that reveals something about us, but distorts
the nature of the thing referenced.24
Under such circumstances, it would be possible to view
human perception and reasoning as adapted for survival of the
species within the context of the planet earth, but there would be
no reason to assign such perception and reasoning any capacity
to distinguish the true nature of any part of the universe. We
might be equipped with the accuracy of perception and reasoning
necessary to further the survival of the species, just as an ant,
cockroach, fish, or fawn has the accuracy of perception and
reasoning necessary to the survival of their species. A cockroach
knows man enough to flee, but does that mean it really knows
man accurately? We may think our higher cognitive powers give
23 See Dan Edwards, The Underlying Conventions of Theological Practice, 53
MERCER L. REV. 1151, 1153 (2002).
24 The argument in this essay generally compares a theistic perspective with a
naturalist, materialist view of the universe. Other options-such as pantheism, and
its scientific or quasi-scientific variations-may be increasingly popular, but are
beyond the scope of this essay. It may be that secular cosmology and science are
moving beyond the rigidly mechanistic view of the universe as a dead cause-and-
effect machine. Christian apologetics also has responses to these alternative
cosmological perspectives, but that debate is beyond the scope of this essay.
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us much more insight into the true nature of reality than a
cockroach, but there is no a priori reason why, like the cockroach,
there might not be world upon world of information about reality
that is irrelevant to our species' survival strategy and totally
beyond our powers of perception and reason.
Thus, within a chance and materialistic universe, facts
themselves would lose their significance, because any
significance we gave facts would be an arbitrary survival
strategy. The existence of "brute" or pure facts would also be
questionable, since our limited knowledge would make every
"fact" subject to being completely inaccurate in the light of other
"facts" we do not know, or as human beings, may be incapable of
perceiving. When you do not have the "whole picture," even that
which you see may not be as it appears.
By contrast, the Christian worldview makes it rational to
believe in limited but effective human capacities to attribute
meaning, perceive facts accurately, and know truly.25 From
within a theistic worldview, the human capacity to perceive,
know, and reason follow from our nature as creatures made in
the image of God. Our capacity to perceive, know, and reason is
an "image" or copy of God's capacity to perceive, know, and
reason. Human consciousness and life are not aberrations in a
dead and chance universe, but are deliberately constructed copies
of the inner consciousness and life of God.
God knows comprehensively and without limitation; our own
knowing is analogous to his knowing, expressed within the
limitations of a creature caught in space and time, and therefore
partial and limited. Under these circumstances, our thoughts
are a form of thinking God's thoughts after Him, however much
those thoughts are limited by our nature as creatures. Thus, if
the omniscient God who created all things made us in His image,
there would be reason to believe that our capacity for knowledge
fits the world into which we have been placed and grants us real
knowledge, beyond that necessary for mere physical survival.
Some theologically-liberal approaches try to relativise the
Christian truth-claim by emphasizing that man's knowledge is
always partial and hence can never be reliable.26 Against this
claim, the answer is that it is possible for a creature to know
25 See Edwards, supra note 23, at 1153.
26 See id.
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truth reliably, even when that knowledge is in a form
appropriate for a creature. However much human philosophy
may try to erect theoretical barriers that say, in effect, that it is
impossible for an omniscient eternal God to reliably communicate
with a limited creature, the answer is obvious: God, the author
of knowledge, knowing, and knower, is capable of designing us so
that we can receive truth in a form adapted to our nature as
creatures. Put another way, we as creatures do not need to be
able to know truth absolutely as God knows it, to know truth
reliably as we know it.
Within the Christian theological tradition, it is generally
asserted that God communicates real knowledge to human
beings through several means, including special revelation-i.e.
scripture-and the natural world.27  Some assert that modern
science developed within the West because the Christian
presuppositions about the nature of man and the universe make
it rational to explore the natural world in search of knowledge.
The expectation that the natural world generally will operate in
an orderly manner according to laws provides an impetus for
empirical and scientific investigation. The propensity to master
the physical world through the development of scientific
technology logically follows from the Biblical account that
humankind exercise "dominion" over the earth.28
Thus, even very theologically-conservative Christians
usually hold a positive attitude toward the advancement of
science and technology. The creationism controversy itself
paradoxically represents this commitment to science despite the
general view to the contrary. From a Christian perspective, the
doctrine of creation makes it rational to explore and master the
world in which God has placed us. From the Christian point of
view, a purely naturalist account of the nature and origins of the
universe reduces science to technique, technique to
manipulation, and manipulation to a futile effort to understand a
universe intrinsically foreign to our nature as conscious living
creatures.29 Since a naturalistic account of the universe can
provide neither a basis for confidence in the scientific search for
2 See id.
28 Genesis 1:28 (New King James).
29 See PHILLIP E. JOHNSON, DARWIN ON TRIAL 150-54 (1991); Phillip E. Johnson,
Evolution as Dogma: The Establishment of Naturalism, FIRST THINGS, Oct. 1990, at
15, 21-22 [hereinafter Johnson, Evolution as Dogma]; see also Romans 1:20.
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truth, nor a foundation for the human attribution of meaning, a
science wedded to a naturalistic cosmology is self-defeating.
This fundamentally philosophical point regarding science
and creation is often obscured within the creationism
controversy, in part because so much attention centers on the
question of evolution. This focus on evolution highlights
conflicting views among evangelical Protestants within the
United States. Some accept theistic evolution, which teaches
that God created species through the process of evolution.
Others reject theistic evolution, but themselves divide over a
range of issues, such as the age of the earth and the existence of
literal "days" of creation. Yet, even the most literalist six day,
young earth creationists accept those forms of so-called
"evolution" that can be empirically observed in the present.
These observable instances of "evolution" are viewed as
variations within species created by God, rather than the
evolution of one species from another. Ultimately, the very use of
the term "creation science" by some in the most literalist camp
suggests a felt need to affirm some kind of science.
One of the significant movements prominent within
Christian understandings of science seeks empirical and
statistical evidence for intelligent design.3 ° These theorists seek
to demonstrate the extreme unlikelihood that the naturalist
mechanisms described in science could, in themselves, create a
universe that would create us: living, self-conscious and
reasoning beings. These theorists do not necessarily deny that
evolution or other naturalist mechanisms were involved in our
creation. Rather, their argument emphasizes the concept of
intelligent design of the universe, or aspects of the natural
world.31 By searching for "evidence" of design, these theorists
seek to overcome the bias of modern natural science, which is
more willing to search for evidence of alien life forms, unseen
parallel universes, or dimensions of reality, than to acknowledge
30 The literature for and against intelligent design is large and constantly
growing. See generally MICHAEL J. BEHE, DARWIN'S BLACK Box: THE BIOCHEMICAL
CHALLENGE TO EVOLUTION (1996); WILLIAM A. DEMBSKI, THE DESIGN INFERENCE
(1998); INTELLIGENT DESIGN CREATIONISM AND ITS CRITICS (Robert T. Pennock ed.,
2001); Johnson, Evolution as Dogma, supra note 29. A classic popular defense of
naturalist Darwinism would be RICHARD DAWKINS, THE BLIND WATCHMAKER
(1987).
31 See BEHE, supra note 30, at 196-97; DEMBSKI, supra note 30, at 9.
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as "science" empirical and statistical evidence that the natural
world is a product of intelligent design.32
A comprehensive exploration of the degree to which the
various forms of creationism are compatible with modern
scientific findings is beyond the scope of this Article. For present
purposes, two points will suffice. First, the less literal forms of
"creationism" appear virtually immune from being proven wrong
through science, as they are capable of viewing any kind of
naturalistic mechanism as means used by God. Thus, even if one
rejects the view that it is a proper domain of the natural sciences
to locate evidence of intelligent design, science is incapable of
disproving the existence of a creator of natural processes.
Second, the fundamental apologetic perspective of creationism is
common to all forms of creationism, from theistic evolution to the
most literal forms of Biblical creationism. All can assert that
"creation" is foundational to the development and credibility of
science, for without such a conceptual framework there is no
reason to credit the scientific method as capable of giving us real
knowledge about the nature of the universe. Thus, the
creationist perspective does not necessarily alter in any way the
scientific method or the findings of science itself, but rather
relates to the nature of human and scientific knowledge.
Ironically, then, theologically-conservative Christians are
met with two contradictory epistemological claims. Naturalists
claim that we should be confident that human beings are capable
of accurately finding truth apart from any God, simply through
powers of observation and reason. According to this view, we
should simply trust in our own powers of observation and reason,
even without a metaphysical or scientific framework that would
make it plausible for human knowledge to be reliable. By
contrast, others claim that true knowledge is impossible for
humankind even if an omniscient God wishes to communicate it
to us, due to the gulf between human and divine ways of
knowing. Against both claims, theologically-conservative
Christianity would maintain that the existence of a theistic God
is both a necessary and sufficient condition for humankind to
attain reliable knowledge.
What does all of this have to do with education? The point of
entry for this discussion was the common charge that
32 See Johnson, Evolution as Dogma, supra note 29, at 18-19.
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theologically-conservative Christian education is somehow
incompatible with higher-order thinking. To the contrary,
however, from a Christian perspective, education not based on
theistic presuppositions, in order to employ higher-order
thinking, predictably must do one or more of the following: (1)
Reduce argument and evidence to a game of rhetoric, in which
the powers of reasoning, ever able to destroy another's positions,
are always pointed outward to the arguments of others, but not
pointed inward against one's own presuppositions; (2) Accept at
the outset, the nihilistic conclusion that comes from employing
pure human reason against one's own arguments, and give up
the search for truth; (3) Arbitrarily assume that human beings
are capable of employing evidence, perception, and reason to
move toward truth, without any adequate cosmological
foundation for that belief; (4) Concoct mock mythologies of
"consent" in which human will substitutes for the incapacity to
demonstrate truth, but use the term "consent" in a misleading
form which allows you to impose your views or will on those
whose views are arbitrarily deemed unacceptable.33
There is, in short, often a good deal of self-contradiction, or
even at times intellectual dishonesty, in much of what passes for
secular "higher-order thinking." One unfortunate effect of an
education steeped in secular "higher-order thinking" is that it
habituates the student to these forms of self-contradiction or
intellectual dishonesty, as though they were normal.34 In using
the term "secular" here, I refer to intellectual processes that
claim to operate contrary to, or completely severed from, any
connection to religious presuppositions. There is another sense
of "secular," which would involve applied reasoning which does
not make any direct reference to revelation or God, and yet which
rests comfortable upon Christian presuppositions. Hence, a
Christian scientist or lawyer could assess evidence and
arguments without commenting on those Christian
presuppositions which make it rational to believe that such
assessment could move usefully toward truth. '
By contrast, theologically-conservative Christians generally
believe that their worldview makes training in "higher-order
thinking" rational, good, and useful. When such thinking is
33 See generally id.
14 See id. at 19-20.
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admitted to be a good gift of God, it can be taught as something
more than a parlor trick, rhetorical flourish, or weapon for
destroying whatever one wills to destroy. Within a Christian
worldview, evidence and reasoning can move us toward truth.
The capacity to perceive reality from multiple perspectives would
be seen as a good gift of God, which helps us appreciate the
complex nature of reality, as well as facilitating communication
across cultural and ideological boundaries. Moreover, such
higher-order thinking is critical to Christianity's capacity to
express and transmit truth in the widely varying cultures and
languages of the world.
This matter of the cross-cultural reach of Christianity is
little appreciated by most secular intellectuals within the United
States, who generally still consider Christianity as principally a
Western religion. Of course, Christianity is not Western in its
geographic origins and historically has been deeply influential in
several different non-Western civilizations, including the
Byzantium and Russian empires.35  Thus, the fact that
Christianity was deeply influential within the West, does not
make Christianity in its origins or history an exclusively Western
religion. This point has been underscored in the twentieth
century, which has seen a dramatic demographic shift within the
Christian religion.36 In 1900, Europe accounted for more than
70% of the world Christian community, while by 2000, this
percentage had shrunk to less than 30%.37 Since evangelicals are
generally deeply involved in world missions, their churches are
generally quite aware of these trends.
The awareness of the cross-cultural reach of Christianity,
combined with the missionary spirit, impacts Christian
educational programs. For example, one popular home-school
program places a major emphasis on educating children about
the various cultures of the world, including a broad range of
books and resources, at several different grade levels, centering
35 See generally WALTER KOLARZ, RELIGION IN THE SOVIET UNION 283-321
(1961); WARREN TREADGOLD, A HISTORY OF THE BYZANTINE STATE AND SOCIETY
119-26 (1997).
36 See, e.g., PHILIP JENKINS, THE NEXT CHRISTENDOM 89-92 (2002); Dana L.
Robert, Shifting Southward: Global Christianity Since 1945, INT'L BULL.
MISSIONARY RES., Apr. 2000, at 50.
"7 See Robert, supra note 36, at 50.
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on non-Western cultures." It is common for "fundamentalist"
curriculum to include substantial coverage of the history,
geography, and varied cultures of the world.3 9 While a secular
cynic would likely complain that Christian children are only
learning about other cultures so they can destroy them, the
perspective of many evangelicals is that Christianity is capable of
being incarnated and indigenized within these various cultures
in authentic ways. That has been the history of the church from
the day of Pentecost onward: to teach universal truth in as many
languages and cultures as exist on the face of the earth.
Cultures, after all, are neither static nor museum pieces to be
preserved as though dead; cultures are constantly developing
through internal developments and interactions with other
cultures. The history of the West is itself, of course, simply just
one of many products of the Christian missionary enterprise of
reaching and then transforming cultures.
The complex Christian understanding of the unity of truth
within cultural diversity requires a variety of higher-order
intellectual skills, involving multiple and critical perspectives.
Within the context of Christian education, these encounters with
non-Western Christian and non-Christian cultural phenomenon
would help the child to be self-critical of their own culture, as
they become aware that their own culture is certainly not
equivalent to Christianity, and include elements that are even
anti-Christian in their implications.
In summary, most theologically-conservative Protestant
Christians would, amidst their diverse perspectives on education,
generally be able to agree on the following principles:
(1) The voluntary principle of individual relationship to
God, with the understanding that an individual child or
adult cannot be forced to love God and profess Christ, and
31 See, e.g., Sonlight Curriculum Catalogue, at 129-30 (Apr. 2004-Mar. 2005),
http://www.sonlight.com. "Sonlight" is evangelical Christian in perspective, while
marketing their curriculum to persons of varying religious perspectives. See id. at
130.
'9 For example, A Beka, one of the most prominent fundamentalist publishers,
publishes and recommends textbooks on various aspects of World History,
Geography and Culture for grades 5, 6, 7, 9 & 10. Examples of these
recommendations include: Old World History and Geography (grade 5); New World
History & Geography (grade 6); History of the World (grade 7); World Atlas &
Geography Studies: Eastern Hemisphere (grade 7); World Geography (grade 9);
World History and Cultures (grade 10). See generally A Beka Home School Catalog
(2004), http://www.abeka.org (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
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that it would be unethical to attempt to use coercion
within those boundaries.
(2) The covenantal and creation principles, which state
that it is appropriate for all children to be raised under
the divinely-appointed authority of parents and those
adults chosen by their parents to teach them, and in
which it is appropriate to teach all children the necessary
self-mastery and self-control for life in society through
enforcement of fixed moral and ethical norms.
(3) The covenant and creation principles as applied to the
children of Christian parent(s), which hold that it is
proper to teach Christianity to children as the truth,
rather than as a mere possibility and option.
(4) A developmental approach to childhood, which deems
it a good to place children under parental and adult
authority, rather than as a violation of autonomy rights.
(5) A view of childhood and education which views the
transmission of academic and cultural knowledge as a
part of the developmental task of childhood, and therefore
as a good rather than as an imposition upon the child.
(6) A view of childhood and education that perceives
cognitive skills and higher-order thinking as an important
goal of education, particularly within the high school
years, and perceives no contradiction between such skills
and a belief that the Christian faith is true.
(7) A desire that children be exposed to a variety of world
cultures, not based on a view of cultural or value
relativism, but rather based on the global mission of
Christianity: to make the Christian faith an indigenous
and genuine part of every people-group and culture on
earth.4 °
IV. STATE REGULATION OF RELIGIOUS EDUCATION: "RELIGIOUS
SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS" OR PROFESSOR DWYER V.
EVANGELICALS?
Discussion of state regulation of religious education does not
occur in a political or cultural vacuum. The context of such
academic discourse within the United States is a large cultural
gap between the academic community and the nation,
particularly in relation to theologically-conservative Christianity.
Within the academic community, theologically-conservative
40 See supra Part III.
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Christianity is viewed as an aberrant sub-culture.4  The
legitimacy of this sub-culture participating in politics and the
culture based on their beliefs is considered doubtful due to the
purported failure to abide by supposedly fundamental principles
of the American order.42 In the context of the 2004 Presidential
election, academics are overwhelmingly secular "blue-state"
Americans who alternate between ignoring and feeling
threatened by their more religious "red-state" counterparts.43
This is not to say, of course, that all theologically-conservative
Christians vote Republican-although a majority apparently
have in recent years-but rather that the cultural gulf noted in
the 2004 Presidential election mirrors in significant ways that
between academics and the larger American society.44
Within the larger culture, there is nothing odd or unusual
about theologically-conservative Christian beliefs. This is not to
say that most Americans are theologically-conservative
Christians, but rather that there are sufficient numbers of
theologically-conservative Christians to make them a
mainstream part of American culture, at least in most parts of
the United States.
The academy within the United States thus is among a
group of significant cultural institutions that are out of sync with
the broader culture on matters of religion. Other such
institutions include the mainstream news media, the national
Democratic Party establishment, and the entertainment
industry.4 5  The predominate ethos within these significant
institutions tends to regard theologically-conservative
Christianity as an alien and aberrant presence within the
broader society.46
While Christianity has played a formative role in much of
the history of the Western intellectual tradition, the tradition has
clearly developed strands that have deliberately distanced
themselves from its theological roots. These deliberately secular
strands of the tradition have developed an apologetic against
theologically-conservative Christianity. According to this
41 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
42 See supra notes 6-9 and accompanying text.
41 See Don Feder, Christians Eat Lions in 2004, FRONTPAGEMAGAZINE.COM
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apologetic, traditional forms of Christianity are oppressive,
outmoded, superstitious, and lack intellectual credibility. Thus,
many American academics are a product of an intellectual
formation largely ignorant of the substantial Christian
intellectual heritage. Trained to view religion principally
through the lens of intellectual traditions which developed in
opposition to traditional forms of the Christian faith, some
cannot understand how any intelligent person of good will can be
either a traditionalist Catholic or evangelical Christian. One
plausible explanation from this point of view is that such persons
have been brainwashed or indoctrinated-for example, by their
parents, or religious community.
Jim Dwyer's work on state regulation of religious education
evidences this difficulty. While Professor Dwyer claims to be
trying to construct a theory about putting the interests of
children first,48 these strands of his theory are overwhelmed by a
contempt for theologically-conservative Christians. Lest some
think I exaggerate, consider the following quotation:
I wish merely to suggest that, in mainstream American culture
today, moral autonomy may be a necessary precondition for
social respect. The great majority of those who populate this
culture tend to regard negatively adults who appear not to
possess this attribute. This is evident in the readiness of many
to disparage those who espouse ideologies or engage in practices
for which they can give no reason other than an appeal to
authority internal to their belief system. We may confront
them, ridicule them, or simply look askance at them for their
blind adherence to the dictates of authority or imitation of
others. This negative regard may be strongest among highly
educated liberals (who, so it is said, control the mainstream
media), but less educated persons and political conservatives, if
they do not themselves belong to a religious community that
disavows self-determination in the realm of morality, are also
likely to condemn unreflective dogmatism when they perceive it.
This attitude must pose a self-respect problem for any
individual who participates in mainstream American life-for
example, by working in a plant or office with persons of diverse
backgrounds and beliefs, by getting involved in politics at a
47 Although Professor James G. Dwyer has written several relevant works, this
essay will concentrate on his book, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
(1998).
48 See id. at 3-6.
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level that brings together diverse constituencies, or by receiving
information through the mainstream media-but who is not, or
is not perceived to be, morally autonomous. The aftermath of
the Scopes Trial in the 1920s, with widespread ridicule of the
Fundamentalist Christians who opposed the teaching of
evolution, led Fundamentalists to withdraw almost entirely
from the political realm. Their reappearance on the political
landscape in the 1980s generated fear and hostility on the part
of mainstream Americans, liberal and conservative. The
backlash against them triggered complaints by
Fundamentalists and even some mainstream scholars that they
were being denied their place in our democracy, silenced in the
public sphere. Some see this as a matter of fairness to persons
with religious outlooks, but I see it as a problem for the
education of their children. Knowing that these children will
incur the scorn of mainstream America if they grow up to be
like their parents, why do we not act to prevent that, for their
sake, rather than expect mainstream Americans to develop a
respect for people who argue dogmatically for reactionary
policies based upon religious premises we do not share?
49
In response to this extraordinary passage from Professor
Dwyer, I would note the following:
(1) Note the "we" for whom Professor Dwyer speaks: "we"
who may "confront," "ridicule," or "look askance" at religious
fundamentalists, do not share their religious premises, and
should act to prevent their children from growing up to be like
them. ° Professor Dwyer simply assumes his readers are not
religious fundamentalists or members of traditionalist religious
communities. Alternatively, he considers any such reading his
book to be interlopers and outsiders in the dialogue in which he
is engaged.
(2) Note the "them" whom Professor Dwyer describes:
"They" who
(a) engage in practices or hold ideologies for which they "can
give no reason other than an appeal to authority internal to
their belief system,"
(b) show "blind adherence to the dictates of authority or
imitation of others,"
(c) are not, or do not appear to be, "morally autonomous,"
" Id. at 172-73.50 Id. at 172.
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(d) cannot retain their self-respect while interacting with
others within the diverse realms of work and politics;
(e) are heirs of the Fundamentalist Christians of the 1920s who
reappeared in American politics in the 1980s, and
(f) "argue dogmatically for reactionary policies based upon
religious premises we do not share."
5
'
This passage is typical of the rest of Dwyer's book in its
approach to describing the kind of religion-and religious
education-that he considers problematic. On one hand, Dwyer
employs overdrawn negative stereotypes of Christian
conservatives that fit relatively few people within the United
States. For example, among the approximately one-quarter to
one-third of Americans who are theologically-conservative
Protestants,52 there are very few who are incapable of giving any
reason for their practices or beliefs aside from invoking the
authority of the Bible or church tradition. Indeed, among the
most "fundamentalist" of Christians, it is common to hear
scientific arguments for creationism, empirical observations
made to support moral principles, or the use of evidence to
support historic Christian beliefs, such as the resurrection of
Jesus. Whether these are credible to Professor Dwyer is another
matter; the point is that even fundamentalist Christians
commonly invoke reasons and evidence that, in Professor
Dwyer's terms, would be external to their belief system.
Similarly, there are very few traditionalist Christians who find
themselves unable to function at work or losing self-respect due
to their incapacity to deal with persons of diverse beliefs.
Professor Dwyer's stereotype of the conservative Christian as a
rigid, "blind," unreflective adherent incapable of functioning in a
diverse society53 would be funny if he were not so serious about it.
Certainly there are some such personalities within the Christian
world, but as overdrawn by Dwyer they are hardly typical.
Moreover, this personality type of the blind adherent unable to
deal with those of fundamentally different views seems to
describe just as well the apparent inability of many within the
secularist camp to accord respect to, and understand, the tens of
millions of Americans who hold theologically-conservative
religious views.
", Id. at 172-73.
52 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
53 See DWYER, supra note 47, at 172.
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Although Professor Dwyer in some ways seems to be
constructing straw men, which actually describe very few
religious Americans, other aspects of his work target for
opprobrium a large plurality of the American population. All
those who believe that God has spoken clearly and
authoritatively on certain fundamental moral and ethical
matters would apparently fit within Dwyer's condemnation of
those who lack "moral autonomy." It is basic to the traditional
structure of Christianity, which teaches that there is one God
who has revealed Himself to humankind, that (1) God has spoken
clearly to human beings regarding many beliefs and practices,
and (2) God's revealed will is authoritative. A wide range of
Christians-not to mention Jews and Muslims-would therefore
appear to lack "moral autonomy" in the sense apparently
intended by Dwyer. Similarly, the percentage of Americans who
believe that the traditional teachings of Christianity on a range
of moral and ethical matters are correct and remain applicable
today would also be significant. Thus, while even the most
fundamentalist Christian will cite evidence and give reasons for
believing God, at the end of the day even many comparatively
moderate Christians agree with the sentiment, "God said it, I
believe it, that settles it."
Indeed, as Part III of this paper suggested, there is a long-
standing viewpoint within the church that moral autonomy, in
the sense apparently favored by Professor Dwyer, is an illusion.
There are, in short, no adequate reasons for holding a moral
view-in the strict logical sense-from within a purely secularist
perspective because in a purely materialist (amoral) universe,
categories of morality are a human invention with no lasting
significance. Within a naturalist world view, "autonomy" is itself
either the illusion of a determined creature caught in the great
cause-and-effect machine of a purely materialist universe, or the
arbitrary assertion of pure self-will; in either view, it is hardly
rational. From a Christian perspective, pure human autonomy is
merely the vain assertion of independence by a creature who
draws every breath in complete dependence on their Maker.
Indeed, if there is a God who has revealed Himself to
humankind, it would be rational, rather than irrational to listen
to Him. And, despite Professor Dwyer, the perspective that there
is such a God is not restricted to a few colonies of overwrought
religious zealots.
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Professor Dwyer's odd combination of overdrawn negative
stereotyping accompanied by a lack of clear definitions leave him
free to feed the religious prejudices of his (presumed) readers.
Consider, for example, his description of Fundamentalists: "the
sociopolitical world view that Fundamentalists share involves
'racism, antifeminism, anti-intellectualism, and plutocratic
politics.' They advocate segregation of the races, traditional
subordinate roles for women, and noninteraction with those who
do not conform to the Fundamentalist ideal-in particular,
nonwhites, Catholics, Jews, atheists, feminists, intellectuals, and
liberals. '54
This description fits the stereotype of religious conservatives
dear to the heart of many of Professor Dwyer's secularist readers.
It is comforting for some to think that most religious
conservatives are a pack of ignorant racists and segregationists
because this allows them to dismiss, without further thought or
investigation, a religious movement that makes them deeply
uncomfortable. While there are certainly some religious
fundamentalists who fit the stereotype, a majority does not.
Indeed, careful sociological investigation has shown that white
conservative Protestants within the United States generally are
not hostile to or prejudiced against persons of other races, and
have attitudes toward race typical of other white Americans.5
This is not to say that white Americans or white evangelicals
have perfect attitudes toward race, but rather to point out that
there is not a sociological association between evangelicalism and
racism.
Moreover, even if one excludes the broader evangelical
movement and only look at "fundamentalists" in the narrower
sense of the term, Dwyer's stereotyping is inaccurate. For
example, the Southern Baptist Convention has explicitly
54 Id. at 16-17 (quoting HAROLD BLOOM, THE AMERICAN RELIGION: THE
EMERGENCE OF THE POST-CHRISTIAN NATION 232 (1992)).
55 SMITH, supra note 1, at 219-22. Smith summarizes some of his findings as
follows:
Like other white Americans, only small minorities of white conservative
Protestants support residential racial segregation, would legally oppose
interracial marriages, or would object to sending their kids to a completely
racially integrated school. Also like other white Americans, a majority
reports that, in the past few years, someone in their family brought home
for dinner a friend who was black.
Id. at 221.
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repudiated its historical role in supporting slavery and
segregation to the extent of having regular "Racial
Reconciliation" Sundays. 56  Indeed, at this point, 20% of the
membership of this bastion of white Southern fundamentalism is
African-American." The independent Baptist Jerry Falwell has
described at some length his own journey on racial issues, and
long ago repudiated the racist practices common in the South-
and Southern churches--of his youth.18  Falwell's Liberty
University is, of course, open to persons of all races, and indeed,
the University's percentage of African-American students
apparently is higher than most of the leading secular
Universities.5 9
Similarly, Dwyer's claim that "Fundamentalists" generally
advocate "noninteraction" with Catholics ° is decades out of date.
Falwell broke this mold a quarter-century ago when he decided
to attempt, within his Moral Majority, to include Americans of
all-or no religious-faiths, including Roman Catholics,
Orthodox, "practicing and non-practicing Jews," and "atheists
and agnostics.' '6I Indeed, Falwell has credited Paul Weyrich, a
Catholic and one of his "very dear friends," with giving him the
concept of a "moral majority."62
56 See Southern Baptist Church Executive Committee, SBC Calendar Dates,
http://www.sbcec.org/calendar%20dates.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
"7 See Amy Green, Southern Baptist Surprise! Why Are So Many African
Americans Attracted to a Church That Was Once Identified with White Racism?,
CHRISTIANITY TODAY (Sept. 2, 2004), available at http://www.christianitytoday.com/
ct/2004/009/23.54.html.
s See JERRY FALWELL, FALWELL: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 301-21 (1997).
9 According to the College Board, Liberty University is "76% White/Non-
Hispanic" and "11% Black/Non-Hispanic." CollegeBoard.com, Liberty University At a
Glance, at http://apps.collegeboard.com/search/CollegeDetail.jsp?match-true&
collegeId=3446&type=qfs&word=liberty%20university.com (last visited Mar. 29,
2005). By contrast, a study of twenty-six leading universities found only one with a
"Black Student Body" above 10%: Emory University, at 10.4%. See The Journal of
Blacks in Higher Education, Ranking America's Leading Universities on Their
Success in Integrating African Americans, at http://www.jbhe.com/features/36
leading universities.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2005).
60 DWYER, supra note 47, at 16-17.
61 See FALWELL, supra note 58, at 384. Falwell's autobiography describes at
some length how he overcame his separationist background to form a broader
coalition. See id. at 381-406. This transformation of the separationist Baptist
movement is a major theme of Susan Friend Harding's interesting study. See
generally HARDING, supra note 3.
62 FALWELL, supra note 58, at 384.
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If one looks to the broader evangelical movement, the
alliance with Catholicism has become both religious and political.
Thus, the "Evangelicals and Catholics Together" ("ECT")
movement has constituted a significant organized effort at
religious, cultural, and political alliance between evangelicals
and Roman Catholics. 63 Indeed, among ordinary evangelicals it
is commonplace to consider Roman Catholic friends to be fellow
Christians.64 Polling indicates that Pope John Paul II was
viewed more favorably among evangelicals than either Jerry
Falwell or Pat Robertson.
65
Dwyer's stereotyping is thus grossly inaccurate, whether
applied to fundamentalists in the narrow sense, or more broadly
to all theologically-conservative Protestants or evangelicals.
Dwyer has apparently employed a stereotype of white Southern
dispensational/separationist fundamentalists from the period
between 1920 and 1970 and applied it to all contemporary
evangelicals.
Thus, throughout his text, Dwyer issues condemnations of
so-called "fundamentalists" that seem to apply to all
theologically-conservative Protestants. For example, when
Dwyer complains of the re-emergence of "fundamentalists" into
politics in the 1980s,66 he appears to condemn the broader group
of evangelicals, for it is generally the larger evangelical
movement, including but not restricted to the narrower
fundamentalist movement, which came into public view at that
time. His complaint of political activism by those who lack
"moral autonomy" or act politically based on religious premises
"we do not share, 67 would implicitly condemn the entire range of
theologically-conservative Christians, Protestant and Catholic.
His definition of "fundamentalism," in terms of the "conservative
religious movement" occurring early in the twentieth century
"among members of various Protestant denominations,"68 would
63 See, e.g., YOUR WORD IS TRUTH: A PROJECT OF EVANGELICALS AND CATHOLICS
TOGETHER (Charles Colson & Richard John Neuhaus eds., 2002).
64 See REIMER, supra note 2, at 48.
65 See Religion & Ethics NewsWeekly, Poll: America's Evangelicals More and
More Mainstream But Insecure, available at http://www.pbs.org/wnet
religionandethics/week733/release.htm (Apr. 16, 2004) (March 2004 poll conducted
by Greenberg Quinlan Rosner Research Inc.).
66 See DWYER, supra note 47, at 173.
67 See id. at 172-73.
68 See id. at 16.
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include theologically-conservative Presbyterianism and other
non-dispensational evangelicals. Dwyer's cited sources, on what
he calls "Fundamentalist schools," center primarily on those
which are fundamentalist in the narrower sense of the term-i.e.,
dispensational in theology and literalist in interpreting the early
chapters of Genesis-but also include a book focused exclusively
on Reformed (Calvinist) schools in Grand Rapids, Michigan, a
book that focuses half of its attention on a school operated by a
Charismatic congregation, and another work that covers a wide
range of evangelical, charismatic and fundamentalist schools.69
If Dwyer had clearly defined and differentiated his
terminology in describing the various strands of theologically-
conservative Protestants, it would have given his work a greater
degree of analytic clarity. As it is, his use of the term
"fundamentalist" seems hopelessly confused and misleading. Of
course, I cannot know whether this is a good-faith oversight or
instead is a deliberate attempt to cast religious conservatives in a
negative light. For present purposes, it is enough to say that his
work has the effect of feeding the unfortunate, and often-
inaccurate, stereotypes of many of his readers.
(3) Note Professor Dwyer's use of the term, "mainstream," to
express the perspective that religious conservatives are a small
minority generally despised by the majority of Americans. 70 This
point seems to be an accurate description of how religious
conservatives are regarded in academia, Hollywood, and the
media. It does not describe, however, how they are regarded in
most places in America. In most of America, theologically-
conservative Christians are well-accepted and demographically
significant participants in the institutions important to daily life,
such as workplaces, public and private schools, political
institutions, libraries and museums, shopping malls and stores,
69 See id. at 14, 184-85 n.14. Thus, Dwyer cites PETER P. DEBOER, THE WISDOM
OF PRACTICE (1989), which focuses entirely on Grand Rapids (Michigan) Christian
School Association schools, see id. at 136; SUSAN D. ROSE, KEEPING THEM OUT OF
THE HANDS OF SATAN: EVANGELICAL SCHOOLING IN AMERICA (1988), which covers
two church-sponsored schools, one from a charismatic church, and one from a
"fundamentalist Baptist" church, see id. at xxi, 7-10, and MELINDA BOLLAR
WAGNER, GOD'S SCHOOLS (1990), which examined schools in a certain location which
"represented all strands of conservative Protestant Christianity," including
"evangelical, fundamentalist, and charismatic, and... the older Holiness and
Pentecostal tradition," id. at 11.
70 See DWYER, supra note 47, at 172-73.
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and charitable, religious, and community institutions. Professor
Dwyer mistakes certain significant cultural institutions for the
entire society.
(4) Last, but most significant, is Dwyer's conclusion that
"we" should "act to prevent" the children of fundamentalists from
growing up to be like their parents.7 Dwyer's explicit reason for
doing so is concern for these children, who otherwise will, like
their parents, incur the "scorn of mainstream America. 72 This
reasoning is extraordinary given that Dwyer is expositing a
theory of justice devoted to pluralism and respect for persons.
Instead of urging respect for this minority culture, Dwyer argues,
let's just eliminate the minority culture!73 How elegant and
simple! Curiously, Dwyer's solution to cultural diversity mirrors
precisely the intolerance he had attributed to fundamentalists.
According to Dwyer, fundamentalists "do not value religious
freedom or diversity ... but rather wish for America to become a
Christian theocracy."74 It is Dwyer, however, who proposes that
the power of the state be used to "prevent" the children of
fundamentalists from growing up to become fundamentalists.75
Dwyer is a secular authoritarian; employing his own misuse of
the term "fundamentalist," Dwyer could be described as a
"secularist fundamentalist."
Dwyer's implicit agenda is apparently to make America safe
for the kind of liberal secularism-or liberal religion?-he prefers
by eliminating the political voice of religious conservatives.76
Rather than constructing elaborate theories for why such
religious conservatives are not permitted to act and speak
politically based on their beliefs, as others have done, Dwyer
constructs an elaborate justification for regulating religious
schools toward the end of preventing religious conservatives from
passing on their faith to their children.77 Of course, Dwyer
himself claims to be writing purely out of concern for children,
and criticizes others when they allow group rights, parental
rights, or societal concerns to trump the well-being of children.78
71 Id. at 173.
72 Id.
" See id.
74 Id. at 17.
71 See id. at 161-66.
76 Id. at 160-61.
77 Id. at 168.
71 Id. at 3-4.
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However, it is Dwyer himself who gives his agenda away by
citing with irritation the political activism of "fundamentalists":
Knowing that these children will incur the scorn of mainstream
America if they grow up to be like their parents, why do we not
act to prevent that, for their sake, rather than expect
mainstream Americans to develop a respect for people who
argue dogmatically for reactionary policies based upon religious
premises we do not share?
79
If one were to apply Dwyer's approach to racial or ethnic
minorities, or religious minorities such as Hindus, Buddhists,
Muslims, or Jews, it seems doubtful that a legitimate University
Press would have even been willing to publish his work.
Generally, the fact that an unpopular cultural group engages in
political activism would not be a reason to advocate that the state
intervene to ensure that the children of the group be "prevented"
from adopting the culture of their parents. However, within the
secularized world of academia, the problem of what to do about
Christian conservatives is apparently in another category, in
which state coercion to suppress the population of certain groups
is given a hearing as a legitimate option.
Dwyer, in short, is seeking to use state regulation of
religious education to achieve cultural genocide for Christian
conservatives within the United States. One definition of
cultural genocide includes:
[Any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the
language, religion, or culture of a national, racial or religious
group on grounds of the national or racial origin or religious
belief of its members such as... [d]estroying or preventing the
use of... schools... or other cultural institutions and objects of
the group.so
Dwyer's proposal, if enacted as intended, would meet this
definition, element-by-element:
(a) intent to destroy the religion of a religious group:
Dwyer intends to destroy the religion of theologically-
conservative Christians within the United States, by state
79 Id. at 173 (emphasis added).
80 LEO KUPER, GENOCIDE 30-31 (1981). This definition comes from a
preliminary draft of the Genocide Convention. It was later decided to remove
cultural genocide from the reach of the Convention, but Leo Kuper maintains that
cultural genocide nonetheless "is commonly treated as [a crime] in much
contemporary writing where it is described as ethnocide." Id. at 31. I have chosen to
use the more recognizable term cultural genocide.
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regulation of education designed to "prevent" these forms of
Christianity from being passed on to the next generation. While
this would not necessarily destroy the group entirely, definitions
of genocide do not require the complete elimination of a group:
"intent to destroy, in whole or in part,"'" is sufficient.
(b) "intent to destroy ... on grounds of the... religious
belief of its members":
8 2
It is clear from Dwyer's extremely negative portrayal of
"fundamentalism," that the supposed religious beliefs of the
group on matters such as gender 3 and morality84 are the grounds
for his proposal.
(c) "deliberate act ... such as ... [d]estroying or preventing
the use of ... schools ... or other cultural institutions ... of the
group":8
5
Dwyer's proposed program of state regulation of religious
schools,86 if enacted, would constitute a deliberate act intended to
prevent the use of religious schools to pass certain kinds of
religious faith from parents to children. Thus, although the
schools would be allowed to exist, Dwyer would literally be
"preventing the use of ... schools ... or other cultural
institutions.., of the group"8' 7 for the purpose intended by the
group, which, of course, is the nurturance of the next generation
in the beliefs and practices of the religious community.
Given the stated purposes of Dwyer's proposed regulation of
religious education, it is unnecessary to discuss its details.
Indeed, it would be offensive to even attempt such a discussion.
Since I was asked to write this essay as a representative of
evangelicals, I cannot enter into discussions regarding the details
of regulations designed to destroy the group I represent. Rather,
my dialogue with Professor Dwyer necessarily would involve a
respectful request that he publicly repudiate his genocidal intent.
Professor Dwyer's proposals illustrate why it is that some
theologically-conservative Christians seek to eliminate or
81 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
opened for signature Dec. 9, 1948, art. 2, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 277 (entered into force
Jan. 12, 1951).
82 KUPER, supra note 80, at 30.
83 DWYER, supra note 47, at 39-40.
8 Id. at 41-42.
85 KUPER, supra note 80, at 30-31.
86 DWYER, supra note 47, at 3-4.
87 KUPER, supra note 80, at 31.
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minimize state regulation of religious education. Many are
concerned that even purportedly reasonable regulations of
religious schools would lead, over time, to governmental action
motivated by religious and political opposition to the very
presence of theologically-conservative Christianity in American
society. Given that some significant sectors of American society
are dominated by those who share Professor Dwyer's motivations
and attitudes, it would not be rational to grant even reasonable
regulatory authority to the state. Why grant power to those who
want to use it to eliminate you?
Some may understandably complain that Professor Dwyer is
at least partly correct: there are some children suffering from
substandard or abusive educational practices in religious schools,
and governmental regulation of religious schools currently is too
lax to alleviate this problem. Shouldn't something be done about
those negative practices Professor Dwyer has so vividly
described, assuming such could be done without deliberately
targeting the religious group for elimination?
Doubtless, there are some educational practices within
religious schools that should not exist, just as there continue to
be substandard and harmful educational practices in many
public schools, despite a myriad of regulations. One cannot tell
from Professor Dwyer's work how prevalent such practices are
because of his strategy of presenting evidence of the worst he can
find as typical, while ignoring the more nuanced story told even
by the sources he cites.
Professor Dwyer further clouds the issue with his clumsy
attempts to denigrate religious practices. Thus, Dwyer
complains that students at religious schools are "preoccupied
with concerns about their sinfulness," or feel "torn between
desire and conscience. 88  He recounts his own childhood
experiences with the Catholic confessional, complaining that he
found it "quite frightening" in his early elementary school years,
while causing him "anxiety" and "embarrass [ment]" as he grew
older.89 Dwyer fails to demonstrate how a secular state can
evaluate and regulate these kinds of teachings and practices in a
religiously-neutral way. Will the state now make it illegal for
children to be taught that they are sinners, because from a
88 DWYER, supra note 47, at 41.
89 Id. at 42.
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''secular" perspective this causes "anxiety." Will the Catholic
confessional be banned for children, because this practice causes
fear, anxiety, and embarrassment? Dwyer fails to address the
many religious and secular perspectives which view anxiety,
inner struggles of conscience, shame, and fear as playing a
legitimate role in the development of a healthy human being.
After all, a person who simply does whatever he desires, feels no
shame or embarrassment at personal wrongdoing, and has no
fear of any negative consequences for his actions, would
rightfully be diagnosed with serious psychiatric disorders.9"
Given that Professor Dwyer is proposing governmental
regulation of an activity, 91 it would be rational to determine the
likely effects of such regulation. Certainly, if Professor Dwyer
was truly concerned with the well-being of children, he would
presumably want to marshal all of the existing evidence
concerning the efficacy of regulations, rather than using children
unnecessarily as regulatory guinea pigs. Presumably Professor
Dwyer is aware of the commonplace problem of unintended
consequences of governmental regulation, not to mention the
problem of ineffective regulation.
Yet, Professor Dwyer specifically refuses in his work to make
any "evaluative comparison" of that part of the educational
system that is highly regulated, to that part which he complains
is under-regulated.92 Specifically, Professor Dwyer rejects any
"evaluative comparison" of public and religious schools deeming
90 One of the studies Dwyer cites regarding fundamentalist schools, Alan
Peshkin's God's Choice, addresses the matter of character development and negative
emotions as follows:
BBA [Bethany Baptist Academy] students get the moral education that
many American parents say they want for their children. BBA parents can
revel in a school that is explicitly, exultantly moral. Those who accept
genetically sinful human nature as fact can find comfort in the doctrinal
bulwark Bethany builds to withstand Satan's onslaught. Those who accept
moral upbringing as the foundation for strength of character as an adult
can find no less comfort, their belief supported by the distinguished
psychiatrist Bruno Bettleheim: "Today... we hope mistakenly that
somehow more and more citizens will have developed a mature morality-
without having first been subject as children to a stringent morality based
on fear and trembling."
ALAN PESHKIN, GOD'S CHOICE: THE TOTAL WORLD OF A FUNDAMENTALIST
CHRISTIAN SCHOOL 281 (1986) (quoting Bruno Bettelheim, Education and the
Reality Principle, 3 AM. EDUCATOR 10, 12 (1979)).
91 DWYER, supra note 47, at 3-5.
92 Id. at 15.
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it unnecessary to his proposal.93 Yet, for some of his areas of
concern, there should be substantial data available as to the
success of regulation in producing the results he claims to seek,
as well as some data regarding the success of religious schools in
those areas. For example, although Professor Dwyer focuses
great attention on academic education and "informed critical
thinking," he makes no attempt to compare the standardized test
results of public school students to those in various kinds of
religious schools.94  Instead, Professor Dwyer simply presumes
that if certain religious and moral teachings are taught to
children as true rather than debatable, the children will lack
certain higher cognitive capacities.95  Such a presumption,
however, would be challenged by a Christian perspective that
believes that higher cognitive functioning is assisted, rather than
limited, by reasoning from certain fixed presuppositions.
Professor Dwyer's lack of interest in comparative academic and
cognitive comparisons of public school students with others
suggests that his supposed concern with "informed critical
thinking" hides a much narrower agenda: he wants children
taught to question the presuppositions of the Christian religion,
but does not mind at all if they are taught as truth the relativist
presuppositions of a secularist mindset.96 Certainly, he cannot
make a case for state regulation of religious education to achieve
the purpose of teaching higher critical thinking skills, without
seeing whether the highly regulated public schools in fact have
been successful in meeting that goal.
Further, although Professor Dwyer cites concerns that
religious schools produce "adverse psychological effects for many
students, including diminished self-esteem, extreme anxiety, and
pronounced and sometimes lifelong anger and resentment,"97 he
ignores the data available to him in the very sources he cites.
For example, one of Dwyer's sources, Alan Peshkin's well-
regarded study of a fundamentalist school, found its students
"significantly less alienated" than their local public school
peers. 98 Similarly, Peshkin, despite his understandable concerns,
93 Id.
9 Id. at 14-15.
95 Id.
96 id.
9' Id. at 15.
98 PESHKIN, supra note 90, at 189; see Charles Glenn, Why are Progressives So
Hostile to School Choice Policies?, CURRENT ISSUES IN COMP. EDUC., Apr. 30, 1999,
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as a Jew, about the impacts of Christian fundamentalist schools,
suggests that attendance at such a school, particularly for
Christian students, would be a warm and supportive experience:
From the inside, where I tried to experience Bethany's world to
the extent that my conscience and convictions allowed me, I
could see a marvelous order, an enveloping sense of peace, an
abundance of the meaning and sense of community that so often
accompany a collective religious experience....
Bethany is an extraordinary haven for those who believe.
Indeed, it is not farfetched to think about Christian schools as
Bettlehei... did about the kibbutzim: as special places, not for
everyone, but surely of great value to many who seek the
security of a particular type of value system and schooling.
99
Peshkin's descriptions of a fundamentalist school hardly
sound like the psychological torture chamber which Dwyer
implies exist at fundamentalist schools, despite the fact that
Dwyer claims that his descriptions of fundamentalist schools are
based on the "consistent portrait" found in all of his cited
sources. "° The question is why Dwyer's overwhelmingly negative
descriptions are so out of accord with so many of the "portraits"
he himself cites?
Thus, the work of Professor Dwyer turns out to be virtually
useless to an informed discussion of the role of the state in
regulating religious education. Indeed, his work is
counterproductive, because it undercuts the possibilities for trust
and cooperation that would be necessary for such a discussion.
To the degree that there are some number of children who would
benefit from a greater degree of governmental regulation of
religious schools, Professor Dwyer's work perversely makes such
regulation less likely to occur. By confirming the worst
suspicions of the conservative Christian world regarding the
governmental regulation of religious education, Professor Dwyer
will, if anything, stiffen the resistance of that community to such
regulation. If the conservative Christian community were a tiny,
powerless minority in American society, such resistance could
easily be pushed aside by brute force. However, given that
theologically-conservative Christians are a significant and
at 1-3 (pointing out conflict between Dwyer and Peshkin on effects of
fundamentalist schools).
" PESHKIN, supra note 90, at 283 (footnote omitted).
100 DWYER, supra note 47, at 14, 184-85 n.14.
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politically-effective plurality in American society, it is difficult to
see how such regulations could be both enacted and enforced over
their objections, at least in most states.
V. PROFESSOR DWYER'S "LIBERAL" THEORY OF EDUCATION
Professor Dwyer's essay in this symposium describes his
liberal theory of education based on political theories of the
liberal state. Aside from Professor Dwyer's denigration of
evangelical Protestantism in his earlier work, I find his past and
present use of political theory unpersuasive. I believe that the
methodology of a "neutral" liberal state is "incoherent, because
any determinate politics must necessarily rely upon and promote
some contestable scheme of values.""1 ° Hence, I believe that the
"progressive" hope that such a theory could give impartial
reasons to "purge politics of the dogmas of orthodoxy" was vain. 102
Similarly, I find Professor Dwyer's hope that liberal political
theory could give impartial or neutral bases for regulating
religious education as equally vain. On a purely analytic basis,
there is no "neutral" way to determine the proper scope of state
regulation of religious education, as such regulations necessarily
implicate "contestable scheme[s] of values."' 3  Thus, Professor
Dwyer's use of terms like "secular," "autonomy," "liberal," and
"illiberal" load substantive value judgments into supposedly
neutral terminology, while claiming all the while to reflect
neutral views of contested issues. The result is that Dwyer
promotes contestable value judgments, but in a hidden way, by
privileging the values he prefers through his use of terms like
"secular" and "liberal."
From my perspective, Professor Dwyer's "liberal" theory of
education, and of political theory, is itself profoundly illiberal. To
the degree that the term "liberal" refers to real limitations on
governmental authority in existing democratic societies, the
protection of the family, private education, and religious liberty
against the intrusions of the state are an important part of the
"liberal" state. I would not claim that the "liberalism" of
contemporary democracies is value-neutral, or ideal, but its
'1 See Andrew Koppelman, The Fluidity of Neutrality, 66 REV. POL. 633, 635
(2004) (citing WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 92-94 (1991)).
102 Id.
103 Id.
2005] EVANGELICAL AND SECULARIST PERSPECTIVES 141
limitations on government authority over the family and
education have provided important social space critical to the
flourishing of a variety of religious and non-religious visions of
the good. Given that some political theorists are concluding that
"the period of neutralist liberalism is now over,"10 4 and that its
academic dominance lasted for only a "brief period" of perhaps
thirty years,' °5 it would seem unwise to abandon political and
social liberties that have developed over hundreds of years, based
on passing academic theories.
To the degree that the mask of neutrality is increasingly
being ripped off of academic theories of the liberal state, what is
often found underneath is a naked set of values preferences. As
my analysis of Professor Dwyer's work indicates, Professor
Dwyer's personal views include a distinctly negative evaluation
of certain kinds of religions commonly found within the United
States-and the world. Once Professor Dwyer's proposals
concerning state regulation of education are clearly seen
emanating from his personal views, rather than from neutral
general principles of the American or "liberal" political order,
those proposals can be properly evaluated. This is not to say that
debate over religious practices or beliefs are illegitimate or
improper; however, as I have tried to demonstrate, Dwyer's
discussion of religion and religious education has lacked analytic
rigor and empirical accuracy. If we are to debate the merits of
various religious practices and beliefs, let us do it well. If we are
going to substantively evaluate which religious practices and
government policies serve the comprehensive good of children,
adults, and communities, let us admit what we are doing, rather
than hiding those judgments behind supposedly value-neutral
theories of liberal education or the liberal state.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Christian church historically has understood that some
will be inordinately, even irrationally hostile toward her,
particularly if humankind's hostility toward God becomes
channeled into a hostility toward Christians and the church.
Where Christianity and the church have in some manner
'04 Id. at 636 (quoting Thomas Hurka, Book Review: George Sher, Beyond
Neutrality: Perfectionism and Politics, 109 ETHICS 187, 190 (1998)).
105 See id. at 635-36.
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wrongfully harmed individuals or groups, the resulting
combination of hostility toward the church can be overwhelming.
Unraveling the varied strands causing hostility toward the
Christian religion is ultimately something which, from a
Christian perspective, can only be accomplished by God. In the
meantime, however, Christians are best served by being trained
to expect such hostility, whether deserved or not. Of course, the
Christian faith has an odd way of reappearing in fresh ways even
among those who were wronged by Christians, as illustrated by
the amazing growth of Christianity among formerly colonized
peoples. Hence, the expectation of hostility should not ultimately
diminish the chastened optimism of the faith. This chastened
optimism of faith comes from believing that God can reconcile to
Himself even those whom have been harmed by God's people. In
this way, God can, if He so pleases, use the church to overcome
and heal the wounds caused by the church.
These comments are meant to place into a broader
theological perspective the understanding of the church when
encountering hostility and the desire to harm, as is often present
today within the academic community in the United States. The
cross-cultural reach of the church, which finds followers among a
myriad of cultures, languages, and ethnic groups, sometimes
seems to find a limit among those who for varying reasons have
formed an identity in opposition to her. Yet, even this barrier is
not seen as necessarily ultimate.
In relation to the academic community within the United
States, it is particularly important that there be present those
who can aptly and faithfully represent the various strands of the
Christian church. Those persons are standing, for the moment,
on generally hostile ground. While it would be easier to retreat
from the academy into more comfortable climes, it is also
important to stay and hear the voices of those who so distrust the
church, for within those voices there will be some elements of
truth, and correctives which the church may need to hear.
If there is to be some form of communication across the
cultural and religious divide, then the Christian academic can
serve as one of the conduits. And to the degree that
communication, rather than mere raw power, is significant to
both the church and her critics, then perhaps the Christian
academic can ultimately be of service to both.
